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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Samuel Glenn appealed from the decision denying his motion to dismiss his
2010 DUI charge, which was enhanced pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(9) (one felony DUI
conviction in the last fifteen years). His motion to dismiss was based on the fact that the
conviction alleged to support the enhancement had been dismissed and the guilty plea
withdrawn pursuant to the district court's 2007 order granting relief pursuant to I.C. § 192604.

The district court denied Mr. Glenn's motion based on the Court of Appeals'

decision in State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), which held that I.C. § 19-2604
relief does not actually vacate the conviction for purposes of DUI enhancements.
Mr. Glenn contends that Reed is manifestly wrong, as it is directly contrary to several
Idaho Supreme Court decisions and improperly interprets I.C. §19-2604, which
unambiguously nullifies a prior conviction. He contends, therefore, that Reed should be
overruled, and as a result, the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss should
be reversed.
The State responds by claiming the issue is not properly before this Court
because the motion below was not timely filed pursuant to I.C.R. 12(d). In doing so, it
ignores the implicit factual findings of good cause or excusable neglect for the late filing,
which were made by the district court when it decided to relax the I.C.R. 12(d) rules in
Mr. Glenn's case.

Because there were implied factual findings of good cause or

excusable neglect for the late filing, the issue is properly before this Court. Even if this
Court finds an abuse of the district court's discretion in regard to I.C.R. 12(d), the proper
remedy would be remand the case for a determination of whether there was good cause
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for the late filing. In addition, even if this Court determines remand is necessary on this
issue, there are still reasons, justified in precedent, for this Court to review the merits of
Mr. Glenn's argument.
The State also asserts that Reed is not wholly contradictory to precedent. This
argument is based on the State's overly-broad reading of two cases: State v. Robinson,
143 Idaho 306 (2006), and State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825 (2007). Neither of those
two decisions actually abrogate or otherwise undermine the general rule, articulated in
Manners v. State Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 107 Idaho 950 (1985), which provides that

once relief is granted in a case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, the conviction in that case is
made a nullity, to be treated as if it had never existed, and so cannot be the basis for
subsequent punishment. Under that rule, Reed is manifestly wrong because it treats
such nullified convictions as if they do continue to exist and allows them to be used to
support future, enhanced charges and sentences. Robinson only holds that, in terms of
the requirement to register as a sex offender, a different statute governs such relief,
and it trumps I.C. §19-2604. Parkinson only holds that the scope of the relief granted
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 does not entitle the defendant to have reporting databases
scoured and all mentions of the case eradicated. It recognizes that the charge is still
dismissed.

Both cases are narrow in their scope, and both are distinguishable from

Mr. Glenn's case.

Most importantly, both decisions reaffirm and rely on the Manners

rule, recognizing its continued vitality.
The State also attempts to defend the Reed decision as a proper interpretation of
I.C. § 19-2604. Aside from being directly contradictory to controlling precedent as to the
scope of I.C. § 19-2604 relief, Reed engaged in unnecessary statutory interpretation by
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conducting an examination of the legislative purposes underlying I.C § 19-2604 and
I.C. § 18-8005, rather than simply giving effect to the unambiguous language of the
statute.

Further, even if the Reed Court's foray into the legislative histories of

I.C. §§ 19-2604 and 18-8005 was appropriate, its conclusions in that regard were
clearly erroneous, as revealed by the Legislature's stated purposes for the respective
statutes. As such, Reed is shown to be manifestly wrong for that reason as well.
Because Reed is directly contrary to several Idaho Supreme Court decisions and
does not engage in a proper interpretation of the statute in question, it is manifestly
wrong and shown to be unwise or unjust, and it should be overruled. Additionally, there
is no contention that the Idaho Supreme Court decisions in this regard should be
abandoned, and so they are controlling precedent which should be followed pursuant to
the rule of stare decisis. Therefore, Reed, which fails to adhere to that legal principle,
fails to follow controlling precedent, and is manifestly wrong, should be overruled. As a
result, the district court's order denying Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss based on Reed
should be reversed and the case remanded for a trial on the misdemeanor DUI.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Glenn's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), should be overruled, such that it
was error to allow the State to enhance Mr. Glenn's sentence for driving under the
influence because he has "pled guilty or has been found guilty of a felony violation of
[the relevant code sections], notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld
judgment(s) ... within fifteen (15) years" where the necessary prior convictions no
longer exists as the prior guilty plea had been withdrawn and the case dismissed.
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ARGUMENT
State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), Should Be Overruled, Such That It
Was Error To Allow The State To Enhance Mr. Glenn's Sentence For Driving Under
The Influence Because He Had "Pled Guilty Or Has Been Found Guilty Of A Felony
Violation Of [The Relevant Code Sections], Notwithstanding The Form Of The
Judgment(s) Or Withheld Judgment(s) ... Within Fifteen (15) Years" Where The
Necessary Prior Conviction No Longer Exists As The Prior Guilty Plea Had Been
Withdrawn And The Case Dismissed

A.

Introduction
Because the district court implicitly found that there was good cause or

excusable neglect in regard to the timeliness of the filing of the motion to dismiss,
Mr. Glenn's claim on appeal is properly before this Court.

Alternatively, even if the

district court made no such implicit finding, the proper remedy is remand for a hearing,
not affirmation of the district court's order denying Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss. At any
rate, there are sound reasons, such as judicial efficiency, for this Court to consider the
merits of Mr. Glenn's argument even if such remand is necessary.
In regard to the merits of Mr. Glenn's claim, the Idaho Supreme Court decisions
consistently reaffirm the rule set forth in Manners:

once relief is granted pursuant to

I.c. § 19-2604, the conviction at issue is dismissed, becomes a nullity, and, as a result,
cannot be used as the basis for future punishment. Therefore, from the moment such
relief is granted onward, there is no valid conviction on the person's record. The Idaho
Supreme Court has also made it clear that, in cases where a charge requires the State
to prove the existence of a predicate offense, there must be a valid, outstanding event
of conviction on the record in order for that charge to withstand a motion to dismiss.
As Mr. Glenn received relief pursuant to I.C. §19-2604, there was no valid,
outstanding event of conviction on his record upon which the State could have premised
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the enhanced charge, and therefore, Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss should have been
granted. The Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary in Reed is directly contradictory
to the Idaho Supreme Court precedent in this regard and engaged in an improper and
clearly erroneous interpretation of the statute. Therefore, Reed is manifestly wrong or
otherwise unwise and unjust and should be overruled, and, as a result, the district
court's order denying Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss should be overruled.

B.

This Court Has The Authority To Consider Mr. Glenn's Claims Even Though His
Motion To Dismiss Was Untimely Under I.C.R. 12(d) Because Of The District
Court's Implicit Findings In That Regard
While the State did challenge Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss on the basis of

timeliness pursuant to I.C.R. 12(d), the district court, in an exercise of its discretion,
"relieve[d] Defendant of his failure to comply with [I.C.R. 12(d)]." (R., p.??) I.C.R. 12(d)
provides: "The court in its discretion may shorten or enlarge the time provided herein,
and for good cause shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party for failure to
comply with this rule." The district court's decision, when given the deference due to it,
was proper, and so the argument on appeal is properly before this Court.

1.

The Issues In This Case Are Properly Before This Court Because The
District Court Implicitly Made The Necessary Findings Regarding Good
Cause Or Excusable Neglect

While the district court may not have articulated the reasons for its decision to
relax the I.C.R. 12(d) time limit in this case, those reasons were implied from the record.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that certain findings of fact may not actually
be articulated, but, based on the record, were nevertheless implicitly made, and should
be given effect. See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625 (1986). When reviewing
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implicit findings of fact in the district court's ruling, all presumptions are construed in
favor of the exercise of discretion. State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 315 (Ct. App. 1993).
In such circumstances, "the implicit findings of the trial court

.. should be

overturned only if not supported by substantial evidence .... '[a]1I presumptions favor
the [trial court's] exercise of [the power to weight [sic] the evidence and draw factual
inferences] and the trial court's findings on such matters, whether express or implied,
must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence."'1

Id. (quoting

People v. Lawler, 507 P.2d 621, 623 (Cal. 1973)) (emphasis from Kirkwood). Such an
appellate review is appropriate because, where the record does not actually contradict
the district court's exercise of discretion, the appellate courts "will not presume error."
State v. Smith, 1

Idaho 771, 773 (Ct. App. 1995); see also State v. Coma, 133 Idaho

29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that, where the record is silent, the silence is "presumed
to support the actions of the trial court").

Additionally, "the burden is upon one who

asserts the law was not complied with, to show that fact, and that he was prejudiced
thereby. 'All the presumptions are in favor of the regularity of the proceedings of courts
of record.'" Jackson v. State, 87 Idaho 267, 276-77 (1964) (quoting State v. Suttles, 13
Idaho 88, 92 (1907)); see also Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 118
(2009) (noting that judges are presumed to know and follow the law).

Therefore,

because regularity is presumed, the unstated reason for the district court's decision in
regard to I.C.R. 12(d) should be presumed to conform to the law.

1 The term "must" establishes a mandatory duty to act in a certain manner, whereas
"may" would authorize, but not require, the proscribed action. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho
841, 848 (1995).
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To that end, if the record demonstrates that the district court made implicit
findings of fact, and those facts are supported by the record, this Court should reject
the State's arguments on I.C.R. 12(d). The implicit findings would constitute a proper
justification of the district court's exercise of discretion to relax the I.C.R. 12(d) timing
rules. See, e.g., Kirkwood, 111 Idaho at 625; Clark, 124 Idaho at 315. The law is clear
in regard to the decision to relax the I.C.R. 12(d) rules: considering untimely motions
simply because the issue presented therein is meritorious without requiring the affected
party to present evidence of good cause or excusable neglect constitutes erroneous
action on the district court's behalf. State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 597 (Ct. App. 1994).
Given that the district court is presumed to know and follow that law, see Bradbury, 149
Idaho at 118; Jackson 87 Idaho at 276-77, it follows that the district court is presumed to
have implicitly made the necessary findings of fact to justify its decision.

The State

admits as much: "the [district] court did not purport to find [the excuse], but considered
the motion regardless for some unstated reason." (Resp. Br., p.7 (emphasis added).)
Therefore, the district court presumably and impliedly found good cause to justify
relaxing the I.C.R. 12(d) requirements (the "unstated reason"), rather than simply relying
on its belief that the claim was meritorious, as the State contends. (See Resp. Br., p.6.)
Additionally, as the record is silent in this regard, that silence is insufficient to
justify finding the purported abuse of discretion of which the State complains. Smith,
127 Idaho at 773; see also Jackson 87 Idaho at 276-77 (holding that the party alleging
error (the State in this case) bears the burden of proving the error). Furthermore, given
that the district court went on to deny Mr. Glenn's motion on its merits based on the
Court of Appeals' decision in Reed, it is difficult to say that the district court exercised its
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discretion simply because it found Mr. Glenn's motion to be meritorious. Compare Dice,
126 Idaho at 597. Therefore, the State has failed to point to any evidence in the record
that actually demonstrates the district court abused its discretion by relaxing the
I.C.R. 12(d) rules. As such, this Court should not presume error and reject the State's
contention in regard to I.C.R. 12(d).
In fact, the record supports the district court's actions based on its implicit finding
of good cause for the delay in filing. For example, the record indicates that the nature of
this motion required defense counsel to engage in a lengthy investigation in order to
adequately research and present the issue to the district court.

Defense counsel

informed the district court, "[w]hen I first talked to Mr. Glenn ... his position was that he
was unaware of the fact that the action taken by Judge Horton didn't basically wipe the
slate clean.

But I told -- I told my client what I would try and do is, I would try and

present the issue again to the court."

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.7, Ls.19-25.)

Defense counsel

stated he approached the issue as "almost kind of like a due process thing . . . . "
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.12, Ls.8-9.) Given that starting point, it is evident that defense counsel
would need time to put the necessary argument together.
Defense counsel also described his investigation. First, "I went through the court
file on Mr. Glenn's original case before Judge Horton..

." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.12, Ls.15-17.)

In order to do that, he would have to had to wait for the clerks to locate the old case file,
and then arrange a time to review that file at the district court, since taking the file from
the district court would subject him to "a one-year penalty in the Ada County Jail as well
as a $5,000 fine." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.15, L23 - p.16, L.22 (describing his investigation so as
to explain why the file from the older case was not included as an exhibit with the
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motion to dismiss).) Defense counsel also stated that he tried to leave as much time as
possible to accommodate the state's subsequent review of that file as well. 2 (Tr., Vol. 1 ,
p.16, Ls.13-22.) He would have had to do this while attending to all his other clients and
duties.
Second, defense counsel informed the district court, "I have trouble in trying to
explain the whole thing to my client is [sic], it didn't really go away completely because
the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion [in ReedJ is, because you entered a guilty plea it's
still there." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.9, L.24 - p.10, L.3.) Therefore, "I talked to [the attorney] who
actually argued -- it was his case, Samuel Reed." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.8, Ls.8-9.) The purpose
of that conversation was to find out the specifics on the argument raised in Reed, why
the case was not pursued to the Idaho Supreme Court, and what defense counsel for
Mr. Glenn could do differently. (See Tr., Vol. 1, p.8, L.9 - p.9, L.7.) Defense counsel

also indicated that conversation could have taken time to arrange, as that other attorney
has part of his practice in Valley County. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.19-20,)
Based on all these explanations, as well as all the other inferences, which are to
be drawn in favor of the district court's power to draw factual inferences in such cases
and the presumption of regularity, there is significant and substantial evidence to uphold
the district court's implicit finding that there was good cause or excusable neglect
justifying the decision to relax the I.C.R. 12(d) timeliness rules in this case.
See Kirkwood, 111 Idaho at 625; Jackson 87 Idaho at 276-77; Clark, 124 Idaho at 315.

The State has not pointed to any evidence which actually contradicts the district court's

This indication that it might take the prosecutor an extended period of time to arrange
such a review also indicates that defense counsel would have needed an extended
period of time to conduct his initial review of that old case file.
2
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exercise of discretion or which demonstrates those actions to be an abuse of the district
court's discretion. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.5-7.) Rather, it only points to the fact
that the record does not explicitly state those reasons. (Resp. Br., pp.5-7.) The fact
that the record is simply silent on the district court's findings does not demonstrate an
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Smith, 127 Idaho at 773; Jackson 87 Idaho at 276-77.
Additionally, the implied findings alone are sufficient to demonstrate that the district
court did not abuse its discretion. See, e.g., Kirkwood, 111 Idaho at 625; Clark, 124
Idaho at 315. Because the implied findings of fact justify the district court's decision to
relax the I.C.R. 12(d) rules, the issue raised by Mr. Glenn on appeal is properly before
this Court.

2.

In The Event This Court Determines There Was An Abuse Of Discretion,
The Proper Remedy Is To Remand For A Determination Of Whether
There Was Good Cause To Relax The I.C.R. 12(d) Rules, And Even
Then, This Court Should Still Consider The Merits Of Mr. Glenn's
Argument

Even if this Court finds that the district court did abuse its discretion in regard to
I.C.R. 12(d), the appropriate remedy is not, as the State contends, affirmation of the
district court's order denying Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss. (See Resp. Br., pp.5-7.)
Rather, the appropriate remedy when there is an unsupported relaxation of the
timeliness requirements of I.C.R. 12(d) is to remand the case for a hearing and
determination by the district court as to whether there was, in fact, good cause or
excusable neglect for the delay. Dice, 126 Idaho at 597.
The only reason remand would not be a proper remedy is if the doctrine of "right
result - wrong reason" were applicable. However, for that doctrine to apply, this Court
would have to be able to find that the adversely-affected party would actually have lost
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his motion on the alternative rationale based on the face of the record.

See, e.g.,

Agrondyne,

see also

Inc.

v.

Beard,

114 Idaho 342,

348

(Ct.

App.

1988);

Robinson v. Compton, 97 Idaho 615 (1976) (recognizing such a determination is only
acceptable "[w]here the order of the lower court is correct"). Such a determination can
only be made where an alternative rule of law, applied to the same body of facts, yields
the same, obviously-correct result. Agrondyne, 114 Idaho at 348.
However, when the issue in question is one which was in the district court's
discretion, "there is no single, legally 'correct' answer. The proper response, when an
exercise of discretion is tainted by legal error, is not to usurp such discretion ourselves
but to set aside the lower court's ruling and to remand the case.

Id. The State admits

that the determination of whether to relax the timeliness requirements of I.C.R. 12(d) is
one that is within the district court's discretion. (Resp. Br., p.5.) Therefore, remand for
clarification on that issue, not affirmation of the district court's order denying Mr. Glenn's
motion to dismiss, is merited if this Court actually finds an abuse of discretion in regard
to I.C.R. 12(d) in this case.

See Agrondyne,

114 Idaho at 348; see a/so

Bingham v. Montane Resource Assoc., 133 Idaho 420, 424 (1999) (holding that "it is
patently unfair to deprive the opposing party of an opportunity to raise a defense to [the
motion in question].,,)3
Furthermore, even if this Court determines remand on the I.C.R. 12(d) issue is
necessary, it should still consider the merits of Mr. Glenn's claim. Compare Dice, 126
Idaho at 597 (deciding "[aJlthough we conclude that the district court erred by failing to

3 In this case, the motion in question is the State's motion to dismiss on LC.R. 12(d)
grounds, and the opportunity to raise a defense is the opportunity to justify the delay.
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require [Mr.] Dice to offer reasons for the delay, we do not remand for a further hearing
because of our decision on the merits of the motion [in question]."); cf State v. Alanis,
109 Idaho 884, 887-88 (1985) (determining that "we reverse the order of the trial court
granting the motion to suppress, recognizing that the acquittal and double jeopardy will
no doubt prevent retrial of this matter," indicating that no excessive use of judicial
resources was necessary given the disposition of that case).

Such determinations

promote judicial efficiency.
For example, if Mr. Glenn does, in fact, have a meritorious claim and the only
reason that claim has gone unadjudicated is defense counsel's failure to articulate a
reason for the untimely filing of his motion to dismiss, the courts would be obliged to
grant Mr. Glenn relief on a post-conviction petition claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel. 4 Such post-conviction relief would likely restore Mr. Glenn's ability to raise this
issue in a new direct appeal to this Court.

Similarly, if Mr. Glenn does not have a

meritorious claim, it would not matter whether the district court determined there was a
justification for the delay in filing the motion. See Dice, 126 Idaho at 597. Therefore, in

To succeed on a post-conviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner must show objectively unreasonable performance by his attorney and
prejudice arising from that unreasonable performance. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho
518, 525 (2007) (applying the standard for such claims established in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). An attorney's failure to timely file a
motion of this nature constitutes objectively unreasonable performance. Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) (also holding that the Sixth Amendment claim of
ineffective assistance is sufficiently different from the claim underlying such a motion as
to be redressable in post-conviction proceedings, even if the petitioner is procedurally
defaulted on the underlying claim); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 795 (1985) (holding
that, where it was clear the motion would succeed, counsel performed ineffectively by
not raising the motion to suppress). Such unreasonable performance would assuredly
have prejudiced Mr. Glenn by allowing the State to prosecute him on an inappropriatelyenhanced charge.
4
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the event this Court determines that the district court abused its discretion when it
relaxed the I.C.R. 12(d) rules in this case, it should review the merits of Mr. Glenn's
argument.

C.

The Decision In Reed Is Manifestly Wrong And Should Be Overruled
The State invokes the rule of stare decisis to defend the Reed decision. (Resp.

Sr., p.6.) That is strange since Reed itself fails to conform to stare decisis. The rule of

stare decisis requires that the courts "follow [controlling precedent], unless it is
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice." State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232 (2005) (quoting Reyes v. Kit
Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239,240 (1998) (in turn quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson,
119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990))).

As such, that rule actually reveals several reasons that

Manners must be given effect and Reed overruled.
First, because Idaho Supreme Court precedent is controlling law, it must be
followed. See, e.g., State v. Morton, 140 Idaho 235,238 (2004). Therefore, the rule of
stare decisis dictates that Manners, which is still good law, and is reinforced by
Robinson and Parkinson, must be followed.

See id.

Because Reed is contrary to at

least one Supreme Court decision,5 in order to save Reed, stare decisis would require
the party advocating in favor of the decision breaking from precedent (in this case, the
State advocating for Reed) to show that the controlling precedents (Manners and its
progeny) are manifestly wrong or unwise and unjust. See, e.g., Watts, 142 Idaho at 232

5 The State does not argue that Reed and Manners are reconcilable. (See generally
Resp. Br.) Therefore, it has implicitly conceded that Reed is contrary to Manners.
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("stare decisis requires that the courts "follow [controlling precedent] unless it [the
controlling precedent] is manifestly wrong .... " (emphasis added)).

The State has

made no such argument. (See generally Resp. Br.)
Rather, the State's only contention in regard to the applicability of Idaho Supreme
Court precedent is that it is contradictory (i.e., that the decisions in Robinson and
Parkinson undermine or otherwise abrogate the rule identified in Manners) and
therefore, a decision purportedly in line with Robinson and Parkinson, but not Manners,
satisfies stare decisis.

(See Resp. Br., pp.10-13.) However, as will be discussed in

detail in Section I(D), infra, Robinson and Parkinson are, in fact, narrowly-applicable
decisions which both reaffirm the principle rule established in Manners.

The claims

adjudicated in those two cases are distinguishable from the one Mr. Glenn raises, as
they only discuss a specific exception to the Manners rule and the limitations of the
remedy available under that rule respectively. As such, they do not abrogate the rule in
Manners, or even call it into question, and so, the Manners rule still constitutes the
controlling precedent in regard to the claim Mr. Glenn raised and which was discussed
in Reed.

Therefore, absent a showing that Manners and its progeny are manifestly

wrong, those decisions should not be discarded in favor of a lower court's contrary
interpretation on the same argument. See, e.g., Watts, 142 Idaho at 232-33 (holding
that the failure to set forth arguments justifying the decision to not conform with
controlling precedent means that the party so advocating has no ability to say that such
precedents should not control).
Second, because Reed is contrary to controlling precedent, it, by definition, fails
to conform to the rule of stare decisis, in that it fails to follow controlling precedent that
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has not been challenged as wrong or unjust.

(See App. Br., pp.6-32 (demonstrating

how Reed is contradictory to controlling precedent); see generally Resp. Br. (not
challenging Manners and its progeny as wrong or unjust).) As a result, Reed itself is
manifestly wrong or unjust and unwise, as it is contradictory to controlling precedent,
and should, be overruled to vindicate the plain, obvious principles of law. See Watts,
142 Idaho at 232.

Therefore, stare decisis actually requires that Reed, a decision

contrary to controlling precedent, be overruled, not deferred to.

1.

The Decisions In Robinson And Parkinson Do Not Reject, Abrogate, Or
Even Call Into Question The Primary Analysis And Rule From Manners

The Idaho Supreme Court in Robinson recognized the rule from Manners and
simply applied part of that rule in a specific instance; specifically, the part that allows
other statutes to trump the general rule from Manners, a decision in line with the specific
exception in that regard which is in I.C. § 19-2604 itself. Similarly, the Idaho Supreme
Court in Parkinson recognized the Manners rule and identified the outer limits of the
relief available under that rule.

Both decisions reaffirmed the primary holding in

Manners: "[w]here a judgment has been vacated under [I.C. § 19-2604], 'it is a nullity,
and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all.'" State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho
308 (2007), (quoting Manners, 107 Idaho at 952); Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828 (quoting
Manners, 107 Idaho at 952). As such, neither decision abrogates or calls into question
the Manners rule to the point where lower courts are free to ignore that precedent.
The State reads Robinson too broadly, asserting that the narrow exception it
fashioned only in regard to the sex offender registration requirements applies to every
case where relief has been granted pursuant to I. C. § 19-2604.
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(See Resp.

Sr., pp.10-12.)
Mr. Glenn's.

The specific factual situation in Robinson is notably different from

In Robinson, the defendant was subject to the sex offender registration

requirement at the time he petitioned the district court for relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-

2604.

Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309.

Relief from that requirement was specifically

governed by another statute (I.C. § 18-8310) and I.C. § 19-2604 has a specific
subsection which makes it inapplicable in regard to the sex offender registration
requirement.

See I.C. § 19-2604(3). Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court held, the

Manners language was inapplicable because Mr. Robinson was not seeking to prevent
future punishment (i.e., proactive relief) based on a previously-nullified conviction.

Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309. In reaching that decision, the Idaho Supreme Court did
not disavow the general rule in Manners.

See id. at 308-09.

Rather, it simply

recognized that a specific statute trumped the relief available under the Manners rule.

Id.

309. As such, Robinson constitutes a narrow exception to the Manners rule, one

which is governed by specific statutes.
Mr. Glenn's case is distinguishable from Robinson, and so falls under the
purview of the rule from Manners.
offender registration requirements.

First, Mr. Glenn was not ever subject to the sex

(See generally R.)

Additionally, there are no

statutes which specifically control relief from DUI consequences.
I.C. § 18-8001, et seq.

See generally

The Robinson Court noted that the real reason Mr. Robinson

could not get the relief he wanted was because another statute explicitly governed the
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question of relief from the consequences of his crime. 6 Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309.
Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court held:
this section [of I.C. §18-8310] does not permit persons convicted of an
aggravated sexual offense to be released from the requirements of the
registration act. ... Therefore, it is clear that [Mr.] Robinson does not meet
the statutory requirements set forth in I.C. § 18-8310 for release from the
registration requirements and expungement. He can only be released
from the registration requirements if setting aside of his guilty plea and
dismissal of his charges under I.C. § 19-2604(1) removes him from the
purview of I.C. §18-8304(1)(d).

Id.

There, the Idaho Supreme Court made it eminently clear that this opinion only

applied to the unique situation where there is a statutorily-imposed, ongoing
consequence resulting from the fact of conviction itself and where relief from that
ongoing consequence was governed by a different statutory provision.? Id.; see also
I.C. § 18-8304(1 )(a) and (1 )(d) (applying the registration requirement to any person who
"is convicted of [an enumerated offense]" or who "[p]leads guilty or has been found

The Robinson decision followed the Legislature's decision to amend I.C. § 19-2604 to
make it clear that I.C. § 19-2604 did not apply in the sex offender registration context.
2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304). (See App. Br., pp.A24-25.) Therefore,
Robinson did not break new ground or abrogate Manners. Had the Legislature wished
to remove other specific offenses or consequences from the purview of I.C. § 19-2604,
it could have done so by similar amendments, but to date, it has not. (See genera fly
App. Br., pp.A 18-A27.) As such, Manners's interpretation of the effects of I.C. § 192604 relief still governs in the DUI context, as well as most other contexts.
7 An equivalent situation in a DUI case could be in relation to an administrative
suspension of a driver's license upon the conviction for DUI. See I.C. § 49-324
(requiring the department of motor vehicles to suspend a driver's license upon receiving
notice of a conviction justifying that suspension). When such a suspension occurs, the
legislature has established a separate set of requirements to reinstate that license.
See I.C. § 49-328. As such, Robinson would potentially prevent a person who received
relief pursuant to I.C. §19-2604 and had the underlying charge dismissed from
challenging the suspension on the basis that there was no longer a conviction on his
record. See Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309. That, however, would be the extent of
Robinson's applicability in the DUI context. Were the State in that hypothetical scenario
to subsequently attempt to enhance a new charge based on the non-existent old
conviction, the general rule from Manners would control. See id.
6
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guilty or a crime covered by this chapter prior to July 1, 1993).8 Because Mr. Glenn's
case does not fall in the specific scenario that formulates the Robinson exception, the

Robinson exception does not apply to Mr. Glenn's case and the general rule from
Manners controls. As such, the new charge is impermissible. See Manners, 107 Idaho
at 952.
Second, Mr. Glenn was not subject to the consequence of enhanced future
charges as a direct result of his conviction; rather, he was only subject to that
consequence after the new charge was filed. As such, the relief he received in 2007
was prospective, barring the State's subsequent attempt to impose a new consequence
premised on the nullified charge in 2010. The enhancement subsections of I.C. § 188005 (subsections (4), (5), (6), and (9)) are clear that there must be a new event of
conviction before the enhancement consequence applies. See, e.g., I.C. § 18-8005(9)
("any person who has pled guilty or been found guilty of [an enumerated offense]

and . .. pleads guilty or is found guilty of a further violation of the provisions of section
18-8004, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a felony") (emphasis added).)

The Idaho

Supreme Court has held consistent to that interpretation, requiring the determination of
whether there are sufficient prior events of convictions to justify an enhanced charge
under I.C. § 18-8005 to be conducted from the moment of the new event of conviction.

State v. Bever, 118 Idaho 80,81-82 (1990) (holding that, until a new event of conviction

8 In the case of I.C. § 18-8304, it is the event of conviction on the crime in question
which triggers the consequence, whereas, in I.C. § 18-8005, the consequence is not
triggered until the new event of conviction occurs. Compare, e.g., I.C. § 18-8304(1)
with, e.g., I.C. § 18-8005(9).
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occurs, there is not sufficient evidence to support the enhanced charge, which should
consequently be dismissed).
The Bever Court considered whether there needed to be three valid convictions
within the specified time frame in order to allow for a charge under one of I.C. §188005's enhancement subsections to be appropriate. Id. at 81. That Court declared that
"we cannot reach the conclusion urged by the State that the legislature intended to
change the controlling event from conviction (or guilty plea) to violation."

Id. at 81.

Additionally, it held that, where there were insufficient events of conviction on the
defendant's record to support the enhanced charge, the defendant's motion to dismiss
should have been granted.

Id. at 82.

As such, it is clear that the applicability of

I.C. § 18-8005 enhancement subsections is controlled by the number of valid events of
conviction which are on the defendant's record at the time of the new event of
conviction. See I.C. § 18-8005; Bever, 118 Idaho at 81-82.
Therefore, because I.C. § 18-8005(9) required a new event of conviction before
Mr. Glenn was subject to the consequence of enhancement, Mr. Glenn was not subject
to the consequence when he received relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. Therefore, his
case does not fall into the Robinson exception (where the defendant was complaining of
a consequence already attached to him before receiving relief pursuant to I.C. § 192604) and Manners controls.
Third, Mr. Glenn's case is different because he is seeking to enforce the relief
granted him proactively. In 2007, Mr. Glenn's conviction was dismissed and his guilty
plea set aside. (R., p.46.) From that moment forward, the conviction and guilty plea
were nullities, to be treated as if they never existed. Manners, 107 Idaho at 952. When
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the State attempted to subsequently base an enhanced charge on that nullified, nonexistent conviction, Mr. Glenn invoked that order to prevent the State's actions.
(R., p.43.)

That difference means the bar on retrospective application discussed in

Robinson is inapplicable in Mr. Glenn's case. Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309 (discussing

the fact that Mr. Robinson was attempting to use I.C. § 19-2604 to undermine a
previously-imposed consequence, rather than a subsequent penalty).

Therefore,

Mr. Glenn's case does not fall within the Robinson exception and Manners controls.
In reaching its decision, the Robinson Court took pains to make it clear that
Manners was still good law; it just was not applicable given the facts and statutes at

play in Mr. Robinson's case:
In Manners this Court accepted the proposition that the effects fo I.C. §192604(1) could be overridden by another statute, and the legislature has
chosen to make all sex offenders apply for relief through the procedures
provided in I.C. § 18-8310. . . . It is presumed that the legislature
knew that guilty pleas could be withdrawn and charges dismissed under
I.C. § 19-2604(1}.
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310 (emphasis added).

The Idaho Supreme Court went on to

describe how, exactly, the Legislature went about making I.C. § 18-8310 override
I.C. § 19-2604, and it is on this explanation that the State hinges its argument. (Resp.
Sr., p.12 (quoting Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310).)

However, the State is mistaken in its belief that the situation discussed in
Robinson arises in the case of I.C. § 18-8005 because I.C. § 18-8005 does not provide

a specific set of procedures by which a person convicted of DUI must go about
expunging his record which would trump the procedures set forth in I.C. § 19-2604.
Compare I.C. § 18-8310.

Absent any such alternative procedures or an express
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exemption of DUI convictions from I.C. § 19-2604,9 the Robinson opinion reaffirms that
Manners is governing law. See Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309-10.) As such, Reed is not
saved by Robinson, because Robinson only establishes an exception to the Manners
rule and that exception is not applicable in the DUI conviction context. Therefore, Reed
is in contravention of Manners, and is manifestly wrong, and should be overruled.
Reed is similarly unredeemed by the Parkinson decision, which the State also
reads too broadly.

(Resp. Br., pp.12-13 (asserting that Parkinson stands for the

proposition that the conviction is not erased for all purposes).)

The question in

Parkinson was only whether, once relief is granted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, that
requires a scouring of all reporting databases and eradicating every mention of the
now-nullified-conviction from them.

Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 827-29 (stating, for

example, that "[b]ased on the foregoing analysis, [I.C. § 19-2604] does not require or
authorize the complete expungement of all records and references to the charge").
Parkinson takes no issue with the general rule from Manners - that relief afforded
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 nullifies the conviction, making it as if it never happened.
Id. at 828. Parkinson simply identifies the outer limit of the relief afforded by a Manners
ruling, namely that the records need to inform viewers that the case has been
dismissed, but no more. Id. As such, the State's assertion that Parkinson somehow
allows the conviction to remain for purposes of new, subsequent punishment misreads
Parkinson: the conviction is dismissed to the full extent described in Manners. Id. at
828. All Parkinson does is indicate that Manners relief is achieved when those records

No such exemption exists, now or as the statute existed when Mr. Glenn was charged.
(See App. Sr. Appendix, pp.A18-A27.)
9
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indicate the charge was dismissed. Id. It does not allow for the dismissed conviction to
be used as the basis for future punishment; that is still forbidden pursuant to Manners.
See id. As a result, Parkinson reaffirms the Manners rule and therefore, Reed, which is
in contravention of Manners, is not saved by Parkinson. Rather, its manifest wrongness
is made clearer, as are the reasons it should be overruled.

2.

The Law Is Clear That, To Support An Enhancement Based On A Prior
Conviction, A Predicate Conviction Must Still Be Valid And Outstanding
On The Record; The Law Is Similarly Clear That, After Receiving Relief
Pursuant To I.C. § 19~2604, There Is No Valid An Outstanding Conviction
To Serve As A Predicate Conviction

As discussed in Section 1(0)(1), supra, the law set forth in Manners remains
clear: once relief is afforded pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, the conviction is nullified, to be
treated as though it never existed, and therefore is not a valid predicate conviction for
future punishment. Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; see also Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 827;
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309. As a result of the dismissal of the charge, the guilty plea is
also necessarily nullified to the same extent. Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310.
Additionally, when it comes to charges requiring proof of a predicate conviction,
such as those enhancements in I.C. § 18-8005, the law is equally clear: there must be
a valid, outstanding conviction on the record.

Bever, 118 Idaho at 82; see United

States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 407 (2008). When read together, the result of those
two points of law is also clear: when the person receives relief pursuant to I.C. § 192604, there is no longer a valid, outstanding conviction, and so the State would be
unable to prove the predicate conviction, meaning it cannot meet the burden of proof on
the new charge, which must be dismissed at the defendant's motion. See Sharp, 145
Idaho at 407; Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 827; Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309; Bever, 118
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Idaho at 82; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952. Therefore, Reed, which allows for exactly the
opposite result to occur, is clearly and manifestly wrong.
In fact, Sharp makes a very poignant observation in this regard. Mr. Sharp had
pled guilty to burglary in Idaho, received a withheld judgment, completed a successful
period probation, and been satisfactorily discharged. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 403-04. But,
as the Idaho Supreme Court took the time to expressly point out, Mr. Sharp "did not
move to have his guilty plea set aside and his case dismissed pursuant to Idaho
Code § 19-2604(1 )."

Id. at 404.

Therefore, according to the Idaho Supreme Court,

when Mr. Sharp was subsequently charged in federal court for felon in possession of a
firearm,10 his "outstanding withheld judgment based on a guilty plea qualifies as a
conviction under Idaho law." Id. at 407. Given that particular conclusion, especially the
use of the term "outstanding," the point of the Idaho Supreme Court's comment in
regard to I.C. § 19-2604 becomes clear: had Mr. Sharp moved for and received such
relief, the judgment and plea would no longer be outstanding and there would be no
conviction on his record upon which the government could base the new charge. 11 See
id. at 404-07; see also Bever 118 Idaho at 82 (holding that, in order to support an

enhanced charge pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(3), which required three events of

10 As with I.C. § 18-8005, possession of a firearm by a felon requires the government to
prove that the defendant has a valid prior conviction for a conforming offense on his
record. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
11 As such, Sharp, which has the same critical facts as Mr. Glenn's case, except that
Mr. Glenn was granted the I.C. § 19-2604 relief, is very relevant to this case. (Compare
Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) It defines when a conviction is valid and able to form the basis for
a charge such as the one filed in this case. Without the valid, outstanding conviction, as
described in Sharp, the State cannot prove that Mr. Glenn is guilty of the crime charged.
With that being the case, the district court's error in denying Mr. Glenn's motion to
dismiss that charge is evident and the manifest wrongness of Reed in allowing such
prosecutions is obvious.
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conviction to prove guilt, there must be three separate, valid events of conviction on the
defendant's record in the requisite time frame, and that, absent the necessary valid
events of conviction, a motion to dismiss such a charge should be granted). Therefore,
since Mr. Glenn's conviction was nullified and his guilty plea set aside before the new
charge was filed, there was no valid, outstanding event of conviction on his record with
which the State could prove the element of the now-charged offense.

As such, his

motion to dismiss should have been granted. See Bever. 118 Idaho at 82; see also
Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407.
In addition to the clarity of the law provided by the numerous Idaho Supreme
Court decisions on point, the statute is itself unambiguous in this regard.

Where

statutes are unambiguous, courts err when they engage in statutory construction, such
as looking at the legislative intent of the statute in question, rather than simply giving
effect to the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai
County, 98 Idaho 925, 928 (1978); Moon v. Investment Bd. of the State of Idaho, 97
Idaho 595, 596 (1976); Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 339 (1964) see also
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011) (reaffirming this
principle after the decision in Reed).
I.C. § 19-2604, as it relates to Mr. Glenn's particular factual scenario (see
App. Br., pp.2-4) is unambiguous:
If sentence has been imposed but suspended ... and upon satisfactory
showing that the court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any
probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms
or conditions of probation ... the court may, if convicted by the showing
made that there is no longer cause for continuing the period of probation,
and if it be compatible with the public interest, ... set aside the plea of
guilty ... and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant.
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I.C. § 19-2604(1)(a). It is clear that the guilty plea is set aside (i.e., no longer valid)12
and the case is dismissed. See id. As such, when the Reed Court determined that "the
purpose of I.C. § 19-2604(1) and I.C. § 18-8005(6) is to promote rehabilitation and
prevent recidivism,,,13 Reed, 149 Idaho at 904, the Court of Appeals decision engaged in
improper statutory construction, attempting to divine the legislative intent of an
unambiguous statute.

See, e.g., Worley Highway Oist., 98 Idaho at 928; see also

Verska, 151 Idaho at 896.

The statute should be enforced as written, which means

Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss should have been granted since his guilty plea was set
aside and his case fully dismissed, leaving no event of conviction on his record to prove
a violation of I. C. § 18-8005(9).
Even if the Reed Court properly reviewed the legislative intent of those two
statutes, its conclusion was clearly erroneous. See, e.g., State v. Henage, 143 Idaho
655, 659 (2006) (a factual determination is clearly erroneous when it is not based on

12 Setting aside a guilty plea basically means there has been no determination of guilt,
such that the defendant's right to have his guilt or innocence determined is restored.
See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 437 (Ct. App. 1994). It follows that a set
aside plea would not trump the jury's verdict of not guilty in terms of that defendant's
record. Cf. id. While relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 is granted irrespective of the
defendant's guilt, it still is clear that vacating the conviction and setting aside the guilty
plea means that the plea is no longer validly on the defendant's record. See, e.g.,
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 308, 310. As such, when a guilty plea is involved, the plain
language of the statue statute declares the guilty plea is set aside, and so, there is no
valid event finding guilt remaining on the record after relief is granted pursuant to
I.C. §19-2604(1).
13 The fact that the Court of Appeals declared that it was construing the statutes so as to
review the purposes thereof, rather than simply give effect to the unambiguous
language demonstrates that, even though the Reed decision includes the proper
standard of review, it did not adhere to that standard, further demonstrating the manifest
wrongness of the decision. (Compare Resp. Sr., pp.15 (claiming that "[n]othing in Reed
supports the assertion that the Court of Appeals ignored the plain language of [the
statutes in question] .... ").)
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substantial and competent evidence). The Statements of Purpose for the two statutes
in question unequivocally demonstrate that the two statutes were not intended to
address the same issues as the Reed Court asserted. See Reed, 149 Idaho at 904.
Rather, I. C. § 19-2604 was designed to provide an additional incentive to defendants to
satisfactorily complete probation or drug court programs, thereby increasing the
effectiveness of those programs.
Sr., pp.A26-27).

2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 104 (H.B. 716) (see App.

On the other hand, I.C. § 18-8005 was "designed to reduce the

number of motor vehicle drivers choosing to drive while under the influence of drugs
and alcohol; thereby making our roads safer for law-abiding citizens." 2006 Idaho Laws
Ch. 261 (S.B. 1397) (see App. Sr., pp.A11-A12). Simply put, I.C. § 18-8005 is intended
to serve as a deterrent to other potential offenders, not to rehabilitate a current offender.
See id. Therefore, the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the two statutes served the
same goals is clearly erroneous. See Reed, 149 Idaho at 904. The fact that the Court
of Appeals reached a clearly erroneous conclusion as to the purposes of the two
statutes and based its analysis, at least in part, on that erroneous conclusion further
reveals the manifest wrongness of the decision in Reed, further justifying overruling that
decision.
Because Reed is directly contradictory to several Idaho Supreme Court
decisions, none of which are inherently contradictory of the others, but which all
reinforce the fundamental rule established in Manners, Reed is manifestly wrong and
should be overruled.

There was no valid, outstanding event of conviction on

Mr. Glenn's record at the time of the new charge because of the relief he had received
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 upon which to base subsequent punishment. Manners, 107
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Idaho at 952; see also Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 827; Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309.
Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to prove the predicate conviction necessary to
prove a violation of I.C. §18-8005(9). See Bever, 118 Idaho at 82; see also Sharp, 145
Idaho at 407. Because Reed should be overruled, the denial of Mr. Glenn's motion to
dismiss premised on that decision should also be reversed and an order consistent with
the plain language of I.C. § 19-2604 and the controlling precedent related thereto
should be entered vacating Mr. Glenn's conviction.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Glenn respectfully requests that this Court overrule Reed, reverse the district
court's order denying his motion to dismiss, and remand his case for a trial on the
misdemeanor DUI.
DATED this 21 st day of February, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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